Strikeouts, Grounders and Fly balls
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Strikeouts, Grounders and Fly balls |
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Are some outs better than others? Do the number of times a runner is
advanced on a grounder or a ball is booted make up for the times the
defense turns two or throws out a lead (unforced) runner? To try to
answer this question, I took Retrosheet's play-by-play data for the
complete 1982, 1983 and 1987 seasons and calculated the number of runs
a team could be expected to score during the rest of the inning for
each of the 24 game situations (0, 1 or 2 outs and all 8 combinations
of runners on base). Here's what I found:
MenOn Number of Outs
FST 0 1 2
--- .495 .261 .100
x-- .879 .521 .226
-x- 1.121 .676 .325
xx- 1.472 .912 .431
--x 1.299 .952 .381
x-x 1.730 1.205 .501
-xx 1.955 1.404 .581
xxx 2.209 1.514 .767
The number of plays was in the neighborhood of 500,000.
I then figured the value of each offensive play by the formula:
( run-scored-on-play + exp-runs(end) ) - exp-runs(start)
For example, a home run with no out and none on would have a value
of (not too surprisingly) 1 run ( 1 + .495 - .495), while a foul out
in the same situation would have a value of -.234 ( 0 + .261 - .495).
This is the same thing that Gary R. Skoog did in the 1987 Bill James
Abstract in his article "Measuring Runs Created: The Value Added
Approach."
I separated these plays into three groups, based upon the speed of the
batter. I used Bill James' Speed Scores (also introduced in his 1987
Abstract) to do this, and picked scores of 3.0 and 5.5 as the dividing
lines. Finally, I examined all plays where the batter hit into an
out (including sacrifice flies and errors) and determined the average
loss associated with each strikeout, grounder and fly ball. With that
as a somewhat lengthy introduction, here's what I found:
Average Weighted
Slow batters Plays Loss Average
strikeout: 17475 -.278 -.282
grounder: 28802 -.262 -.261
fly ball: 28562 -.261 -.261
Average batters
strikeout: 33785 -.276 -.283
grounder: 63691 -.244 -.249
fly ball: 64532 -.257 -.260
Fast batters
strikeout: 16776 -.268 -.282
grounder: 36428 -.230 -.240
fly ball: 32803 -.254 -.263
One strange thing about the average loss column is that the speed of
the batter seemed to lessen the loss associated with a strikeout
(-.278 for the slow runner and only -.268 for the fast one). This
was caused because fast runners are more likely to hit in situations
where the loss due to a strikeout is low (leading off an inning, for
example). The "Weighted Average" column weights each situation
according to its percentage in the entire sample. These results agree
with common sense: speed at the plate is little help when the batter
either strikes out or hits the ball in the air.
They also show that a grounder, especially for a fast runner, is on the
whole a better way to fail than either a strikeout or fly ball. Of
course, this would vary from situation to situation. The following
table show the penalties for each class of out in all 24 game
situations for the slowest class of batters:
Slow batters (speed score < 3):
MenOn 0 out 1 out 2 out
FST K GO PO K GO PO K GO PO
--- -.232 -.210 -.231 -.159 -.146 -.160 -.099 -.093 -.099
x-- -.372 -.463 -.364 -.303 -.356 -.300 -.225 -.210 -.224
-x- -.444 -.261 -.401 -.346 -.294 -.350 -.323 -.300 -.325
xx- -.557 -.548 -.519 -.494 -.567 -.490 -.429 -.392 -.420
--x -.346 -.208 -.219 -.566 -.257 -.225 -.377 -.337 -.372
x-x -.534 -.395 -.409 -.720 -.580 -.341 -.491 -.441 -.489
-xx -.540 -.265 -.373 -.827 -.295 -.366 -.576 -.508 -.581
xxx -.681 -.579 -.454 -.747 -.819 -.404 -.759 -.664 -.732
Most of this make sense. The absolute worst time to strike out is
with men on second and third and one out. The difference between a
strikeout and a grounder is these situations is a whopping .532 runs.
On the other hand, a strikeout is the best kind of out with a man on
first and none or one out. The fly out is almost always in the middle,
except when the bases or loaded or there's men on first and third
with less than two outs. By the way, since the expected runs with
none on and two out is .100, you might expect the cost of a strikeout
to be -.100 instead of -.099. The difference is the relatively rare
cases where a batter reaches first after a strikeout due to a passed
ball or wild pitch.
The table for medium and fast batters:
Medium speed batters (speed score >= 3 AND < 5.5):
MenOn 0 out 1 out 2 out
FST K GO PO K GO PO K GO PO
--- -.232 -.208 -.231 -.160 -.144 -.159 -.099 -.092 -.099
x-- -.373 -.413 -.369 -.305 -.327 -.303 -.225 -.209 -.222
-x- -.442 -.236 -.386 -.352 -.277 -.344 -.324 -.290 -.320
xx- -.589 -.548 -.521 -.494 -.541 -.489 -.430 -.390 -.425
--x -.346 -.167 -.209 -.568 -.208 -.184 -.375 -.326 -.375
x-x -.521 -.391 -.384 -.699 -.509 -.311 -.501 -.444 -.486
-xx -.551 -.277 -.337 -.825 -.302 -.438 -.581 -.503 -.571
xxx -.695 -.425 -.401 -.747 -.595 -.376 -.767 -.651 -.751
Fast runners (speed score >= 5.5):
MenOn 0 out 1 out 2 out
FST K GO PO K GO PO K GO PO
--- -.231 -.207 -.231 -.159 -.143 -.160 -.099 -.090 -.099
x-- -.375 -.392 -.374 -.304 -.300 -.307 -.224 -.209 -.223
-x- -.441 -.250 -.386 -.346 -.289 -.354 -.320 -.295 -.323
xx- -.565 -.412 -.528 -.491 -.439 -.490 -.431 -.384 -.421
--x -.346 -.215 -.203 -.571 -.267 -.197 -.375 -.326 -.381
x-x -.539 -.280 -.405 -.731 -.379 -.369 -.501 -.448 -.497
-xx -.551 -.302 -.387 -.828 -.348 -.461 -.572 -.497 -.571
xxx -.695 -.352 -.450 -.753 -.524 -.413 -.767 -.672 -.731
So what does this mean in real life? How much of an advantage does
a slow batter who grounds out a lot have over one who strikes out a
ton? To get some insight into this, I made up two hitters who each
accounted for 400 outs in a season. Here's the breakdown of their
outs:
K GO FO K GO FO
Hitter A: 60 240 100 Hitter B: 150 100 150
Hitter A would be consider a low strikeout, high ground-ball hitter.
His ratio of 2.4 grounders to fly balls would be among the highest
in the league. Hitter B is at the other end of the spectrum, with
a lot of strikeouts and relatively few grounders. So using the
normalized penalties (described in the previous note) of -.282 (K),
-.258 (GO) and -.264 (FO): we get the following aggregate loss:
Hitter A: -105.66 Hitter B: -107.55
Or less than two runs over the course of a season. Sure, this doesn't
seem like a big difference--hitter A's outs cost about 2 runs a season
less than hitter B's, but this is true despite the fact that hitter A
will ground into around 23 double-plays compared to less than 10 for
hitter B. So where hitter A should be getting credit for making
slightly less costly outs, he will in fact be charged for all those
extra double-plays.
This difference gets larger as the batter gets faster.
K GO FO GDP PEN K GO FO GDP PEN
Slow: 60 240 100 23 -105.66 B: 150 100 150 10 -107.55
Medium: 60 240 100 19 -102.74 B: 150 100 150 10 -106.35
Fast: 60 240 100 12 -100.82 B: 150 100 150 10 -105.75
In other words, the faster you are, the greater benefit you get from
hitting a lot of grounders. Which means those grumpy old men are correct
when they complain about high strikeout totals. Still, no one goes
up to the plate intending to strike out; rather, they have developed a
batting style that make them more or less vulnerable to whiffing.
Often, these styles arise out of physical limitations and sometimes out
of a belief that the increased power every time they DO make contact
more than offsets the high strikeout totals. But are they correct? As
a start to answering this question, I looked at all the players with
300 or more plate appearances in a season and divided them into 4 equal
size groups based upon the percentage of strikeouts per plate
appearance. From 1990-96 this gave me 4 groups of 415 players each,
with the dividing lines between the groups 11.1%, 14.4% and 17.9%. At
the two extremes were Bo Jackson in 1993 (106 Ks in 308 PAs) and Tony
Gwynn in 1995 (15 Ks in 577 PAs). Here are the median averages for the
four groups:
K PCT Bavg Slug OBP OPS
< 11.1% .285 .399 .348 .745
11.1% - 14.4% .276 .411 .346 .752
14.4% - 17.9% .269 .419 .336 .756
> 17.9% .259 .438 .334 .770
This is about what I expected. Contact hitters have a much higher
batting average than the free-swingers (26 points), but their advantage
is much less in on-base percentage (14) and does not come close to
making up for their deficiency in slugging average (-39). In short, the
more you strikeout, the higher your on-base plus slugging average. Now
this does not mean that the free-swingers are necessarily better
hitters--as much as I love OPS, I'm not convinced that on-base
percentage shouldn't be weighted more than slugging percentage. Also,
since the strikeout kings have a lower OBP, that means they are using
up a few more outs, and I've already shown that these outs are
slightly more costly than those made by hitters with low strikeout
totals. Still, a 39-point advantage in slugging is a lot to give up to
gain a 14-point boost in on-base percentage.
But before the coaches among us start advising their players to swing
for the fences on every pitch, perhaps they might want to consider
the data for the 1980s. During this decade there were 2296 qualifying
players, giving me 4 groups of 574 each. This time the dividing lines
were 9.7%, 12.9% and 16.2% of strikeouts per plate appearance, and the
ends of the spectrum were occupied by Bo Jackson in 1987 (158 Ks in
434 PAs) and Bill Buckner in 1980 (18 Ks in 616 PAs). Here's the table:
K PCT Bavg Slug OBP OPS
< 9.7% .278 .378 .341 .717
9.7% - 12.9% .271 .406 .338 .743
12.9% - 16.2% .264 .403 .327 .732
> 16.2% .256 .421 .323 .741
While the relationship between the two extreme groups is about the
same, the best group in this decade seems to be the second,
those striking out somewhat less than normal. The 1960s and 1970s
reverted to form, however. To save space, here are the dividing lines
and only the OPS for the groups, ordered from lowest to highest
strikeout percentage:
1970s 8.9% 11.7% 15.0% .699 .723 .729 .758
1960s 9.9% 12.8% 16.2% .699 .719 .732 .739
Prior to that, things weren't quite so clear cut. For one thing, the
hitters' strikeout totals were only a pale imitation of what they would
one day become. A strikeout percentage of 9.9% would qualify a hitter
for the top group prior to the fifties, but would land him among the
contact hitters from the sixties onward. It's kind of sad what passed
for a free-swinger in those days. Here's the data:
1950s 7.0% 9.7% 12.7% .762 .746 .748 .764
1940s 5.3% 7.5% 9.9% .726 .720 .726 .735
1930s 4.9% 6.8% 9.1% .768 .762 .763 .780
1920s 4.0% 5.6% 7.8% .781 .763 .752 .764
Tom Ruane
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