RBI Production--A New Look at an Old Stat
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RBI Production--A New Look at an Old Stat |
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People who take their baseball statistics seriously usually have little patience for the RBI. It often measures opportunity more than production and has been used by fans to prop up the reputations of some pretty mediocre hitters. When Joe Carter topped 100 RBIs for Toronto last year, I compiled a list of the worst hitters to knock in 100 runs. Here it is: Year Team Player OPS RBI
1993 OAK A Ruben Sierra .678 101
1990 SD N Joe Carter .681 115
1997 SD N Joe Carter .683 102
1964 NY A Joe Pepitone .699 100
1983 BOS A Tony Armas .707 107
1917 NY N Heinie Zimmerman .708 102
1992 CHI A George Bell .712 112
1927 PIT N Glenn Wright .716 105
1940 PIT N Maurice Van Robays .718 116
1916 STL A Del Pratt .722 103
I used OPS (on-base plus slugging percentage) for this and my feeling was that once you adjusted for the era in which he plays, Joe Carter could probably lay claim to having the worst season ever for someone with a 100 or more RBIs. By the way, the median OPS for players doing this is .904. In his 10 seasons, the best Carter's ever done was the .849 he posted in 1986. By the way, it's hard to imagine anyone calling Maurice Van Robays over-rated, but the modern players on this list certainly enjoy a reputation far beyond their meager talents. Or do they? How much of Carter's success is due to the hitters getting on base ahead of him and how much to his performance in RBI situations? My first attempt at answering this was to take his performance in 1990 (when he knocked in 115 runs with a .232 batting average) and break it down by each of the 24 game situations (with outs ranging from zero to two and men on base going from bases empty to full). I next tackled the age-old question: how many RBIs would Joe have had batting cleanup for the 1967 White Sox? Here's the inevitable chart leading up to my guess. On the left is the number of plate appearances Carter had in each of the 24 game situations and the number of RBIs he got in them. On the right, is the number of plate appearances the clean-up hitter for the 1967 White Sox had in the same situations: ------ Joe Carter ------ 1967 CHI A
Times Up RBIs Times Up
FST 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
--- 154 101 81 5 2 3 208 83 84
x-- 31 46 53 3 8 7 29 38 54
-x- 5 21 26 1 7 3 12 25 41
xx- 8 28 29 1 5 11 11 16 13
--x 4 4 15 1 0 6 3 8 24
x-x 4 13 16 4 8 3 0 7 5
-xx 3 15 15 4 7 3 2 10 1
xxx 4 10 11 3 14 6 1 1 7
Assuming Carter hit as well as each of the 24 situations (and we wouldn't want to detract from his clutch ability), our 1967 version would've produced 82 RBIs instead of 115. The surprising conclusion from all of this is that it's better having Roberto Alomar and Tony Gwynn hitting in front of you than Ken Berry and Tommy McCraw. But what if we had replaced Carter in the San Diego lineup with someone else? How many runs would an average hitter had driven in while batting in the same situations as Carter? To determine this, I first figured out the average number of RBIs in each of the 24 game situations. Next, I calculated the number of times each hitter got up in these situations and, using the data from the first step, came up with the RBIs an average hitter would've ended up with. Finally, I subtracted his expected from actual RBIs to yield his RBI production. This method effectively levels the playing field--a lead-off hitter is no longer hurt by batting so frequently with the bases empty, and the expectations for a hitter like Carter, who got up over 240 times in 1990 with men in scoring position, would rise in accordance with his opportunities to drive in those extra runs. To continue picking on Joe Carter, here's his breakdown, compared to the league average RBIs in each situation: ------ Joe Carter ------ 1990 NL
Times Up RBIs Average RBIs
FST 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
--- 148 96 77 5 2 3 .023 .020 .021
x-- 29 44 50 3 8 7 .061 .070 .067
-x- 5 20 22 1 7 3 .130 .140 .169
xx- 8 26 26 1 5 11 .220 .252 .242
--x 4 4 15 1 0 6 .484 .492 .223
x-x 4 13 16 4 8 3 .537 .579 .313
-xx 3 15 15 4 7 3 .518 .505 .289
xxx 4 10 11 3 14 6 .733 .828 .503
Now, the left-hand side of this table is a little different than the my earlier one because, except for the bases-loaded case, I've removed walks and hit-by-pitches from the equation. My feeling is that I didn't want to penalize hitters with a good eye (or an elbow in the strike zone). I suppose some might disagree with this, but one criticism of RBIs is that it rewards players who swing at everything. One example: from 1995 to 1997, Barry Bonds walked 122 more times than Joe Carter with men in scoring position. Part of this was a huge disparity in intentional walks and in a lot of other cases Bonds' reputation caused pitchers to simply pitch around him. For years, Boston sportswriters criticized Ted Williams for not expanding his strike zone with men in scoring position. I tend to side with Ted on this one. Back to the chart, an average hitter with 148 times up with no outs and none on would be expected drive in about three and a half runs. Carter drove in five. If you complete the table, you end up with an expected RBI total of 89. Subtracting this from the 115 runs he actually drove in, it turns out that he accounted for 26 MORE runs than an average player would've in the same situations. Frankly, this is not what I wanted to find. I mean, this is a guy who hit .232 and, while he had some power, 24 home runs is not a tremendous amount for an outfielder. He hit somewhat better with men in scoring position, but a .267 batting average (with 7 home runs) doesn't seem to account for all those extra RBIs. In the 1991 Elias Baseball Analyst, they tried to explain this by noting the extra opportunities and concluding that "RBIs are not an equal opportunity statistic." But given the same opportunities, an average hitter would've had 26 fewer RBIs. So far I've been comparing Carter to an average NL hitter, but it's probably fairer to compare his production to someone playing the same position. For Carter in 1990, this was centerfield about two thirds of the time, with the rest of his season spent in left and at first base. This doesn't lower his production much. Once we adjust for the position he played, his expected RBIs go up slightly to 93.5, but that still means he drove in 21.5 more runs than an average outfielder/first baseman would've done in his place. How did he do it? Here's how he hit with each of the eight combinations of men on base: FST AB H 2B 3B HR SF RBI ERBI Avg Slg
--- 321 68 12 0 10 0 10 7.8 .212 .343
x-- 123 28 7 0 7 0 18 10.4 .228 .455
-x- 47 11 2 0 1 0 11 9.7 .234 .340
xx- 60 14 3 0 2 0 17 16.6 .233 .383
--x 18 5 0 0 2 0 7 6.4 .278 .611
x-x 26 8 0 1 0 4 15 15.4 .308 .385
-xx 18 6 2 0 0 2 14 11.2 .333 .444
xxx 22 7 1 0 2 2 23 15.9 .318 .636
A single isn't going to do much for your RBI totals with a man on first. In those situations, Carter produced 7.6 more RBIs than expected, despite a .228 batting average, by hitting a lot of doubles and home runs. He exceeded expectations nearly as much with the bases loaded, courtesy of two grand-slams and a batting average over .300. It's not too hard to see why Elias missed this: the first situation was lumped with the bases-empty case, while the 18 at-bats with the bases loaded were too few to noticeably raise his average with men in scoring position. One other thing that helped was the performance of his runners on base. In 1990, a runner typically scored from second on 60.9% of singles. Joe Carter hit 25 singles that year with a man on second. The runner scored 23 times, or 8 more than you'd expect. This might be due to the speed of the runners ahead of him (Bip Roberts, Roberto Alomar and Tony Gwynn), the type of singles Joe Carter hit (or more to the point, how deep the outfielders played when he was at the plate), or the luck of the draw. Here are the best and the worst of the 1991 NL in RBI production: All Same Pos
Player Team RBI Exp Diff Exp Diff
Matt Williams SF N 122 72.8 49.2 79.3 42.7
Ryne Sandberg CHI N 100 60.9 39.1 57.5 42.5
Barry Bonds PIT N 114 64.8 49.2 73.4 40.6
Kal Daniels LA N 94 56.4 37.6 64.0 30.0
Darryl Strawberry NY N 108 64.1 43.9 78.3 29.7
Billy Hatcher CIN N 25 45.3 -20.3 49.2 -24.2
Charlie Hayes PHI N 57 71.0 -14.0 75.3 -18.3
Craig Biggio HOU N 42 61.5 -19.5 60.3 -18.3
Eric Yelding HOU N 28 47.8 -19.8 45.7 -17.7
Milt Thompson STL N 30 38.9 -8.9 47.3 -17.3
Joe Carter was 8th best. Bobby Bonilla ( 91.0 - 108.4 ) and Joe Carter ( 89.0 - 93.5 ) had the highest expected RBI totals in the league, both before and after adjusting for the positions they played. In case you're wondering about the position adjustment, here are the RBIs by position in the NL that year. P 218
C 740
1B 1093
2B 783
3B 913
SS 684
LF 957
CF 799
RF 1086
PH 377
Bonilla played rightfield in 1990. It's a little strange, but centerfielders that year had only 16 more RBIs than second basemen and 59 more than catchers. The average for each position (excluding pitcher and pinch-hitters) was 882. In light of this, you might have thought his expected runs would DROP after adjusting for his position. That didn't happen for two reasons: 1) the games he played in left and at first, and 2) quite a few centerfielders hit leadoff that year, artificially depressing (somewhat) their RBI totals. Note that I am not claiming that this statistic gives us any insight into clutch performance. A great hitter who hits worse with men on base will still drive in a lot more runs than expected. It is also not intended as an overall measurement of offense--we already have better ways of doing that. But if you want to talk about RBIs as one facet of a player's performance, this is another way of looking at that stat. Here are the top hitter each year from 1981 to 1996 in position-adjusted RBI production: All Same Pos
Year Player Team RBI Exp Diff Exp Diff
1981 Mike Schmidt PHI N 91* 47.8 43.2 53.4 37.6
1982 Dale Murphy ATL N 109t 73.3 35.7 76.3 32.7
1983 Dale Murphy ATL N 121* 69.1 51.9 76.5 44.5
1984 Mike Schmidt PHI N 106t 68.5 37.5 74.3 31.7
1985 Dale Murphy ATL N 111 67.0 44.0 68.5 42.5
1986 Mike Schmidt PHI N 119* 68.2 50.8 79.8 39.2
1987 Andre Dawson CHI N 137* 81.4 55.6 97.2 39.8
1988 Eric Davis CIN N 93 59.5 33.5 59.9 33.1
1989 Kevin Mitchell SF N 125* 66.9 58.1 76.7 48.3
1990 Matt Williams SF N 122* 72.8 49.2 79.3 42.7
1991 Will Clark SF N 116 62.6 53.4 76.1 39.9
1992 Darren Daulton PHI N 109* 58.7 50.3 58.3 50.7
1993 Barry Bonds SF N 123* 61.5 61.5 73.0 50.0
1994 Jeff Bagwell HOU N 116* 61.5 54.5 75.3 40.7
1995 Mike Piazza LA N 93 53.6 39.4 55.1 37.9
1996 Andres Galarraga COL N 150* 81.9 68.1 97.3 52.7
All Same Pos
Year Player Team RBI Exp Diff Exp Diff
1981 Eddie Murray BAL A 78* 50.3 27.7 49.7 28.3
1982 Robin Yount MIL A 114 78.1 35.9 67.9 46.1
1983 George Brett KC A 93 57.6 35.4 57.7 35.3
1984 Dave Kingman OAK A 118 75.1 42.9 84.8 33.2
1985 Cal Ripken BAL A 110 85.5 24.5 68.6 41.4
1986 Jose Canseco OAK A 117 79.7 37.3 83.6 33.4
1987 George Bell TOR A 134* 89.1 44.9 95.8 38.2
1988 Kirby Puckett MIN A 121 89.0 32.0 86.7 34.3
1989 Robin Yount MIL A 103 69.4 33.6 67.2 35.8
1990 Kelly Gruber TOR A 118 74.7 43.3 73.7 44.3
1991 Cal Ripken BAL A 114 76.0 38.0 64.7 49.3
1992 Mark McGwire OAK A 104 53.7 50.3 64.2 39.8
1993 Juan Gonzalez TEX A 118 69.4 48.6 74.2 43.8
1994 Ken Griffey SEA A 90 52.4 37.6 45.3 44.7
1995 Albert Belle CLE A 126t 76.3 49.7 74.9 51.1
1996 Ken Griffey SEA A 140 85.9 54.1 82.7 57.3
* - led league in RBIs t - tied for league lead in RBIs
My adjustments changed the top of the NL very little. In 12 of the 16 years, the league leader was at the top of my list as well. It was a different story over in the AL. Here's the top of their 1985 RBI race. All Same Pos
Player Team RBI Exp Diff Exp Diff
Don Mattingly NY A 145 93.0 52.0 113.6 31.4
Eddie Murray BAL A 124 75.4 48.6 92.2 31.8
Dave Winfield NY A 114 93.2 20.8 98.1 15.9
Harold Baines CHI A 113 86.4 26.6 93.7 19.3
George Brett KC A 112 69.4 42.6 73.8 38.2
Bill Buckner BOS A 110 96.1 13.9 117.3 -7.3
Cal Ripken BAL A 110 85.5 24.5 68.6 41.4
Carlton Fisk CHI A 107 69.8 37.2 68.8 38.2
Jim Rice BOS A 103 87.2 15.8 91.8 11.2
Cecil Cooper MIL A 99 85.5 13.5 100.9 -1.9
Ripken gets a BIG boost from the position adjustment, as the shortstop jumps over (among others) three first basemen. Buckner's adjusted expected RBIs was the highest during the eleven years I looked at, and perhaps all three of them suffer unfairly from being compared to each other. On the other hand, shortstops dominate the top of the AL list, taking five of the top spots. Down at the bottom, here are the players with the lowest position- adjusted RBI production: All Same Pos
Year Player Team RBI Exp Diff Exp Diff
1981 Pete Rose PHI N 33 38.4 -5.4 49.4 -16.4
1982 Gene Richards SD N 28 43.0 -15.0 47.5 -19.5
1983 Alan Wiggins SD N 22 41.9 -19.9 47.8 -25.8
1984 Marvell Wynne PIT N 39 53.7 -14.7 57.1 -18.1
1985 Vince Coleman STL N 40 52.9 -12.9 59.0 -19.0
1986 Vince Coleman STL N 29 56.1 -27.1 58.8 -29.8
1987 Glenn Wilson PHI N 54 67.9 -13.9 81.3 -27.3
1988 Vince Coleman STL N 38 54.0 -16.0 59.0 -21.0
1989 Vince Coleman STL N 28 50.7 -22.7 58.1 -30.1
1990 Billy Hatcher CIN N 25 45.3 -20.3 49.2 -24.2
1991 Andres Galarraga MON N 33 44.9 -11.9 52.1 -19.1
1992 Brett Butler LA N 39 58.3 -19.3 58.9 -19.9
1993 Otis Nixon ATL N 24 50.0 -26.0 48.2 -24.2
1994 James Mouton HOU N 16 35.1 -19.1 38.4 -22.4
1995 Kevin Stocker PHI N 32 56.5 -24.5 48.3 -16.3
1996 Brian Hunter HOU N 35 62.0 -27.0 60.9 -25.9
All Same Pos
Year Player Team RBI Exp Diff Exp Diff
1981 John Wathan KC A 19 35.3 -16.3 34.5 -15.5
1982 Miguel Dilone CLE A 25 44.0 -19.0 50.0 -25.0
1983 Willie Wilson KC A 33 53.9 -20.9 56.2 -23.2
1984 Kirby Puckett MIN A 31 56.8 -25.8 56.6 -25.6
1985 George Wright TEX A 18 43.9 -25.9 45.7 -27.7
1986 Dave Collins DET A 27 49.4 -22.4 52.6 -25.6
1987 Gary Pettis CAL A 17 49.2 -32.2 47.2 -30.2
1988 Glenn Wilson SEA A 17 33.7 -16.7 39.0 -22.0
1989 Dave Gallagher CHI A 46 70.0 -24.0 67.6 -21.6
1990 Pete O'Brien SEA A 27 50.4 -23.4 57.5 -30.5
1991 Milt Cuyler DET A 33 56.8 -23.8 54.2 -21.2
1992 Lance Johnson CHI A 47 70.1 -23.1 72.0 -25.0
1993 Luis Polonia CAL A 32 59.3 -27.3 62.2 -30.2
1994 Ed Sprague TOR A 44 60.0 -16.0 63.2 -19.2
1995 Don Mattingly NY A 49 69.3 -20.3 89.2 -40.2
1996 J.T. Snow CAL A 67 79.6 -12.6 96.4 -29.4
From 1984 to 1988, Kirby Puckett managed to go from the worst RBI man in the league to the best, an incredible transformation. Andres Galarraga also managed this trick, but in his case he was helped as much by his change of home-parks (Olympic Stadium to Coors Field) as he was by a change in hitting ability. A change of scenery was less helpful to Glenn Wilson. The worst RBI man in the NL for the Phillies in 1987, he moved over to Seattle in 1988 and became the worst RBI man in the AL. Here are the career leaders in unadjusted RBI production from 1981 to 1996: All Same Pos Player RBI Exp Diff Exp Diff Eddie Murray 1501 1101.4 399.6 1286.3 214.7 Barry Bonds 993 614.4 378.6 696.6 296.4 Mark McGwire 860 534.5 325.5 638.3 221.7 Jose Canseco 1033 719.5 313.5 791.2 241.8 Darryl Strawberry 935 622.1 312.9 727.1 207.9 Andre Dawson 1268 956.9 311.1 1100.0 168.0 Dale Murphy 1018 724.9 293.1 797.5 220.5 Mike Schmidt 808 515.1 292.9 579.0 229.0 Fred McGriff 910 619.8 290.2 737.3 172.7 Harold Baines 1307 1039.8 267.2 1140.6 166.4 And the bottom: All Same Pos Player RBI Exp Diff Exp Diff Brett Butler 560 769.1 -209.1 741.5 -181.5 Alfredo Griffin 452 650.0 -198.0 545.2 -93.2 Ozzie Guillen 513 706.3 -193.3 583.2 -70.2 Willie Wilson 470 641.0 -171.0 636.8 -166.8 Harold Reynolds 353 520.3 -167.3 428.9 -75.9 Otis Nixon 246 412.8 -166.8 393.7 -147.7 Vince Coleman 346 510.1 -164.1 547.8 -201.8 Ozzie Smith 685 847.5 -162.5 714.4 -29.4 Omar Vizquel 284 437.1 -153.1 363.7 -79.7 Willie Randolph 455 603.5 -148.5 501.4 -46.4 After you adjust for the position they played, here's the top of the heap: All Same Pos Player RBI Exp Diff Exp Diff Cal Ripken 1369 1185.1 183.9 992.7 376.3 Barry Bonds 993 614.4 378.6 696.6 296.4 Lou Whitaker 937 827.3 109.7 687.4 249.6 Ryne Sandberg 997 816.8 180.2 752.1 244.9 Jose Canseco 1033 719.5 313.5 791.2 241.8 Albert Belle 751 493.1 257.9 515.7 235.3 Mike Schmidt 808 515.1 292.9 579.0 229.0 Ken Griffey 1194 959.7 234.3 965.9 228.1 Mark McGwire 860 534.5 325.5 638.3 221.7 Dale Murphy 1018 724.9 293.1 797.5 220.5 And the bottom: All Same Pos Player RBI Exp Diff Exp Diff Vince Coleman 346 510.1 -164.1 547.8 -201.8 Brett Butler 560 769.1 -209.1 741.5 -181.5 Willie Wilson 470 641.0 -171.0 636.8 -166.8 Otis Nixon 246 412.8 -166.8 393.7 -147.7 Luis Polonia 343 470.9 -127.9 487.0 -144.0 Gary Pettis 259 386.8 -127.8 375.1 -116.1 Tony Pena 697 796.2 -99.2 801.4 -104.4 Dave Collins 211 293.7 -82.7 313.2 -102.2 Ken Oberkfell 364 429.3 -65.3 464.9 -100.9 Joe Orsulak 398 454.9 -56.9 497.0 -99.0 One thing I should probably talk about is the abundance of lead-off men at the bottom. I had advertised (and still believe) that my calculations leveled the playing field with respect to RBIs, no longer penalizing the lead-off hitters for batting so often with the bases empty. If that's the case, why are so many lead-off men doing poorly? The obvious reason is that managers are reluctant to waste a power hitter (or a good RBI man) at the top of the lineup, and no matter how you look at RBIs, a lack of power is going to hurt you. When Puckett trailed the pack in 1984, he had a total of 17 extra-base hits (and no home runs) in 129 games. By 1988, he had increased that to 71 extra-base hits (with 24 home runs). And very often the hitters at the bottom of this list were not major-league caliber hitters. Vince Coleman's legs put him into the St. Louis lineup, not his bat, and for most of his career he was truly awful at the plate, especially for an outfielder. Tom RuaneI would like to thank Paul Wendt for his suggestions on this article.
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